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ABSTRACT: Responding to a set of wicked problems pertaining to weak or failed states, state 
building remains circumscribed by many of the problems it strives to address. Despite the 
expansion of literature, the challenging task of (re)building states in a postconflict setting is 
characterized by inadequate intellectual and policy coherence. Engaging with the existing 
literature, this paper seeks to add clarity in ways which relate directly to the agendas of 
academic research and policy making. Casting into sharper relief what is distinctive and/or 
familiar in state formation processes in the West and the rest of the world, the analysis 
highlights the differing impact of nationalism. In considering the critique that contemporary 
international-led state building neglects nation building, the paper suggests that the stateness 
of polities undergoing state building is intrinsically linked with nationhood. State building 
resides in both international and national locations of politics that condition the constitution of 
national identity via multiple (unequal) exchanges between external and local actors which can 
be depicted in terms of mimicry. Multiple political locations of state building notwithstanding, 
the task of bringing the imagined community into being is more suited to national actors. 
Ongoing challenges of nation and state building require more acknowledgement that the 
realization of the nation cannot be a primary domain of international actors. 
 
Introduction 
More often than not state building tends to be understood as the obverse of state failure or state 
fragility. This is so particularly since the early 1990s when concerns with underperformance of 
weak states impinged firmly the security agenda. Not only is the aspiration of security the 
bedrock of state building, but strong state performance is a mediating factor to the provision of 
peace and security. Conflict, on the contrary, is understood to be a by-product of low state 
capacity (Krasner and Pascual 2005; Call and Wyeth 2008). More than one and a half billion 
people live in (failed) states that cannot maintain security and order, regional stability, or the 
rights and needs of their populations (Richmond 2014a, p. 12). At the same time threats from 
individuals and groups residing in failed states remain real. A key strategy of the international 
community in response to these threats has been to try to build more capable states that can 
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govern their own territories effectively. Hence learning how to do state building better is hoped 
to benefit long-term security and sustainable peace. 
 
The link between state building and security is a constant in the existing literature (see, for 
instance, Lake 2016; Krasner and Pascual 2005; Call and Wyeth 2008; Edelstein 2009; Dodge 
2006). Much has been written on how best to conceptualize state performance (Migdal 1988; 
Badie and Birnbaum 1983; Skocpol 1979) and the levels of the state’s delivery of political 
goods (Rotberg 2004). Moreover, the understanding of statehood in terms of state capacity has 
led to a tendency to approximate the state with its institutions. In point of fact it is difficult to 
find a publishable piece on contemporary international-led state building that does not pay 
attention to state building as institution building (refer, for example, to Fukuyama 2004; Paris 
2004; Hameiri 2007; Lemay-Hébert 2009, 2013). Another prominent faction of the related 
literature concerns itself with the quality of the emerging peace (Heathershaw 2008; Richmond 
2014b; Richmond and Pogodda 2016; Visoka 2015; Lewis 2017) and challenges of obtaining 
a modicum of legitimacy (Lake 2016). The rapid growth of literature, nonetheless, has not 
resolved all the puzzles of state building processes. It is curious that, as Richmond (2014b, p. 
12) notes, with the expansion of the literature and as state building has become mainstream, it 
has ‘lost its policy and intellectual coherence.’ Indeed, there seems to be no ‘comprehensive 
understanding of the scope of the concept and of the conundrums that it presents for policy’ 
(Chandler and Sisk 2013, p. xx). In the light of the vastness of the state building literature and 
the experience base of the process, one scholar openly declared: ‘I make no claim to 
comprehensiveness’ (Brinkerhoff 2014, p. 334). 
 
Acknowledging the wide range of the relevant literature and the ambiguity in the understanding 
of the concept and practice of state building, this contribution seeks to add clarity with reference 
to two themes that are currently overlooked in existing publications. These two neglected 
themes pertain to lack of (1) a focused analysis of the genealogy of contemporary state building 
and (2) a systematic consideration of the correlation between state building (as institution 
building) and nation building (as national identity building) and the international state builders’ 
positions to these. Consideration of these two themes relate directly to both the agendas of 
academic research and policy making—as Western administrations rethink their engagement 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere, and draw lessons from the history of recent 
interventions.  
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Despite the vast literature, there is a prevailing ahistoricism in the existing appraisals of state 
building. Such an attitude resonates with an observable disinterest that International Relations 
(IR) as a discipline has in history given that investigations of the international order remain 
defined by the transhistorical condition of anarchy and the elusive quest for zero-sum security. 
IR is preoccupied with what nation states do to each other, but it eschews the question where 
the nation comes from. IR tends to ‘freeze’ the nation and prioritize instead the understanding 
of the state and its evolution. Moreover, IR scholars are not much concerned with what nations 
are, and how what they do produces their beings. Engaging with these overlooked questions 
this paper traces the genealogy of contemporary state building in processes of state formation 
in Western Europe. Offering a focused comparison between state formation in Western Europe 
and non-Western sphere the analysis suggests that the present neglect of an explicit focus on 
nation building as opposed to state building has a precedent in the processes of state formation 
in the West during the millennia preceding the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Although 
the expansion of the state system in the decolonization era led to more attention being given to 
the idea of the nation (refer for instance to Gellner 1983; Bhabha 1990), the latter still remains 
insufficiently explored. Moreover, in considering the critique that contemporary state building 
neglects nation building, this contribution emphasizes the mediating role of nationalism in the 
construction of the national community. It maintains that the stateness of polities undergoing 
state building is intrinsically linked with nationhood (and national identity)—a link that will be 
explored in the comparative context of postcolonial literature. Before developing these claims, 
the analysis casts a light on the meaning of key terms in order to clarify the terminology. It 
highlights that in responding to a set of ‘wicked’ problems pertaining to weak or failed states, 
contemporary international-led state building has been penetrated itself by some features of 
these problems. Indeed, state building as a strategy to consolidating internal order remains 
circumscribed by many of the problems it strives to address. 
 
A ‘wicked’ problem and terminology 
The existing literature indicates how ambiguous the terminology of state building is. Indeed, 
uniform definitions are lacking as it will become apparent below. In light of the prevailing 
ambiguity, ‘wicked’ is an attractive metaphor to characterize challenges of state building not 
only in terms of policy but also terminology.  
 
State building refers to endeavours of national and / or international actors with the view of 
establishing, reforming, and enhancing state institutions where they have been consumed or 
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destroyed frequently as a consequence of armed conflict (Call 2008, p. 5). Institutions are 
thought to be central to the conduct of a state. Depending on their institutional performance 
states may be placed on a continuum of strength, belonging to various ideal types, ranging from 
strong or consolidated states to failed or collapsed states. The most desired, strong, states are 
those ‘whose main features are strong linkages between the physical, attitudinal, and 
institutional components’ (Holsti 1996, p. 90). A weak state is perceived as a polity that ‘lacks 
institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies’ (Lemay-Hébert 2013, p. 4). Similarly, 
a fragile state is characterized by a ‘government [that] cannot or will not deliver core functions 
to the majority of its people’ (UK Department of International Development, 2005). A failed 
state, according to Gerard Helman and Steven Ratner (1993, p. 5) reflects ‘a situation where 
governmental structures are overwhelmed by circumstances’. As David Lake has pointed out 
failed states ‘possess neither a monopoly of violence nor legitimacy’ (Lake 2016, pp. 32-33). 
Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995, p. 9), for his part, has spoken of 
state collapse as ‘the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with 
resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and 
chaos’. Failure and fragility, though related, are not coterminous. While state fragility indicates 
that there is a threat of failure, deterioration to warfare is not an automatic outcome (Hameiri 
2007, p. 127). For instance, whilst all states of the East European block were fragile in 1989—
and some of them even failed to provide basic services to their populations—only one of them, 
the former Federation of Yugoslavia, succumbed to violence during the post-communist 
transition. 
 
Weak, fragile, collapsed, or failed states constitute a category of problems that can be referred 
to as ‘wicked’. The term ‘wicked problems’ has been attributed to Horst Rittel who used it to 
refer to a class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, inherently complex, 
information about which is misleading, where decision makers involved have conflicting 
values, and where ramifications for the whole system are unclear.1 The adjective ‘wicked’ 
describes the mischievous quality of these problems, implying that proposed ‘solutions’ may 
wind up worse than the symptoms (Churchman 1967, pp. B141-B143). ‘Wicked’ is used not 
necessarily to suggest that the problems concerned are ethically deplorable, but rather in the 
sense that ‘they are “vicious” … or “tricky” …’ (Rittel and Webber 1973, pp. 160-1).  
 
State weakness/fragility and collapse/failure epitomize the essence of a wicked problem set: 
the weak states—as a category—cannot be precisely defined (as exemplified by the adjectives: 
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‘collapsed’, ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, or ‘weak’—states); (attempted) solutions tend to have internally 
conflicting goals, calling for (difficult) trade-offs; (attempted) solutions are conditioned by 
resource constraints and politically determined schedules; attempts at solutions produce 
unforeseen consequences, sometimes even unanticipated harm that leads to further 
disagreement over the nature of the problem and possible outcomes (Brinkerhoff 2014, pp. 
334-5; also, Paris and Sisk 2009). Manifestation of these characteristics of wicked problems in 
the context of weak states can be found in virtually any case of such states. 
 
What is more significant is that some features of wicked problems in the weak states’ context 
find expression in the attempted solutions, including state building. For instance, there is a 
frequent tendency of (exogenous) state building to create local dependency on international 
actors, and to create state institutions that are more accountable to international parties than 
local populations (Lemay-Hébert 2009; Richmond 2014b). Furthermore, under the guidance of 
international actors the emerging state has not been, primary, a result of local power struggles 
and negotiations between national stakeholders, because the state’s scope has been restricted 
(De Guevara 2008, p. 361; Chandler 2010).  
 
The conceptual vagueness characteristic of the weak/fragile and collapsed/failed states is 
reflected in the process of tackling their problems via state building. The central definitional 
question pertaining to the latter relates to the definition of the state itself. In scholarly terms the 
meaning of state varies depending on the nature of the research question and the context of 
analysis. In general, there are two broad conceptions of state: a national-territorial concept 
according to which the state comprizes the whole territory denoted on a map and all which is 
within it (people, government, resources); and a more limited, institutional concept of state. As 
Anthony Giddens (1985, p. 17) notes the ‘state’ sometimes means the overall social system 
subject to the government or power and sometimes an apparatus of that government or power. 
The latter—institutional—conception of state is attributed to the work of Max Weber (1946) 
and disseminated via the works of Charles Tilly (1975a, 1975b, 1992), Randall Collins (1986), 
Joel Migdal (1988), and Theda Skocpol (1979). The former conception of state has been 
embraced in the works of Nicolas Lemay-Hébert (2009), and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas 
Onuf, and Vojin Rakić (2014) in what they call the legitimacy approach to state building. 
 
While both conceptions are heuristic abstractions, they have varying implications for the 
conception and policy of state building. The narrow, institutional conception of state leads to 
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technocratic state building that focuses on state capacity through institutional reconstruction 
(Hameiri 2007; Lemay-Hébert 2009, p. 26). The broad conception of state, on the other hand, 
leads to what is known as the legitimacy approach to state building which ‘concentrates on 
socio-political cohesion in the rebuilding process’ (Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu 2015, p. 245). 
It ought to be noted, nonetheless, that the broader the conception of the state the more 
challenging it is to materialize such conception. The vast majority of state building literature 
concerns itself with questions pertaining to the institutional (re)constitution of states (a sample 
of this literature includes Fukuyama 2004; Paris 2004; Lemay-Hébert 2013). Consideration of 
such questions will not be replicated here. Instead emphasis will be placed on how the building 
of states has been approached in recent history, and whether stateness and nationhood have 
been detached in current state building practices. 
 
State Building in Western Europe and Beyond: Some Relational Remarks 
In a rare, albeit brief, consideration of historicity of state building, Catherine Goetze and Dejan 
Guziman (2008, p. 320) have suggested that it is the democratization processes of Southern 
Europe in the 1970s and in Latin America in the 1980s that offer the template for the policy 
programmes of today’s state building. This view, however, takes a huge historical shortcut. For 
the genealogy of state building can be traced in processes of state formation in Western Europe, 
whose state model has served as a template for states in the rest of the world. The exportation 
of the Western state is evident in the following statistics: whereas in 1500 European states held 
political control over about 7 percent of the earth’s land, their share of political control over 
Earth’s land grew to 35 percent in 1800, and 84 percent in 1914 (figures from Headrick 1981, 
p. 3). It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that since ‘the modern state is a 
quintessentially European phenomenon … it is to … Europe’s story that one has to look to 
explain it’ (Buzan and Little 2000, pp. 20-1).  
 
What the history of the West shows is that its corresponding process of state building, or state 
making, has been inherently violent.2 ‘In the pursuit of a monopoly of force, those agencies 
that came to stand as the state had to expropriate the means of violence from different social 
entities that competed with the emerging state’ (Boege et al 2008, p. 5). Analysing state making 
in the European continent Charles Tilly argued that from AD 990 onwards, major mobilizations 
for war provided the chief occasion on which states consolidated, expanded, and created novel 
forms of political organization. Whereas war making was an activity in service of external 
stability, state making—or state building—served the internal order (Tilly 1992, pp. 52, 70). 
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Until the eighteenth century European statesmen were not very keen to attend to popular 
demands. While establishing direct rule, states in Europe moved from a reactive to a proactive 
form of repression. Rebellions were punished forcibly, and civilian populations were disarmed. 
At the same time, within their boundaries states imposed national languages, educational 
systems, and military services. Externally, European states controlled movements across 
boundaries and treated foreigners as distinctive kinds of peoples entitled only to limited rights. 
Consequently, ‘life homogenized within states and heterogenized among states’ (Tilly 1992, p. 
116). 
 
Two contemporary scholars have opined that state building ‘historically was … for the most 
part quite endogenous’ (Chandler and Sisk 2013, p. xxii). However, in his systematic 
consideration  of the formation of the West European states, Charles Tilly has noted that the 
expansion of the European template ensured a move from ‘a relatively “internal” to a strongly 
“external”’ state formation process—a trend that has continued and accelerated through to the 
present era. Tilly (1992, p. 182 also p. 207):  
[C]ompacts of powerful states have increasingly narrowed the limits within which any 
national struggle for power occurred. … That narrowing restricted the alternative paths 
of state formation. Throughout the world state formation converged on the more or less 
deliberate construction of national states … according to models offered, subsidized, 
and enforced by the great powers. 
 
In his study of state- and nation building in Europe, Samuel Finer (1975, pp. 85-6) opined that 
state formation in Western Europe shows that national states—in the European image—have 
come to acquire five salient characteristics: (1) they are territorially defined populations that 
recognize a common paramount organ of government; (2) the government consists of 
specialized personnel; the civil service that carries out government’s decisions and the military 
service that backs these by force if necessary; (3) each state is recognized by other states as 
independent in its action upon its subjects (a recognition that constitutes ‘international 
sovereignty’); (4) the population residing within the state forms a community characterized by 
a common nationality; and (5) members of the community—in principle, at least—mutually 
distribute and share duties and benefits. The first three characteristics are constitutive features 
of state building whereas the last two are associated with nation building. For the purposes of 
terminology clarification, it is worth noting that state building involves territoriality and 
function (closely associated with workings of government institutions), whereas nation 
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building refers to processes whereby state elites strive to render the boundaries of the state 
congruent with those of the nation (Mylonas 2012). 
 
The above-mentioned five characteristics of modern states find expression in the notion of 
stateness, which can be conceived as a key feature of statehood. As the European model of 
state expanded, the world has moved gradually towards stateness, in that, the processes of state 
making have centered on ‘consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of governments 
from other organizations, acquisition of autonomy (and mutual recognition thereof) by some 
governments, centralization and coordination’ (Tilly 1975b, p. 70). By the nineteenth century 
virtually all West European governments had arrived at a relatively high level of stateness 
(Tilly 1975b, p. 34). 
 
Moreover, the populace of the Western states was relatively homogenous in cultural terms due 
to processes of unification under the Roman Empire and (deliberate) institution by state elites 
of a national language, a state religion, mass public instruction, and sometimes expulsion of 
ethnic minorities (Tilly 1975b, pp. 27, 77; Mulaj 2016, pp. 542-548).3 The relative 
homogeneity of populations in Western Europe was a facilitating factor in the emergence of 
West European national states particularly because it eased the division of lands into exclusive 
territories (although some of them were subjected to subsequent change). Furthermore, this 
relative homogeneity facilitated construction of unified states by lowering the cost of state 
making insofar as it rendered uniform administrative arrangements feasible, promoted loyalty 
of subject population, and made uniform communication systems available to the rulers (refer 
to Fischer and Lundgreen 1975).  
 
Samuel Finer’s definition of the state mentioned above incorporates nation building in the 
conception and practice of state making. But Charles Tilly has insisted on ‘the analytic 
separation of state building from nation building’ in the context of analyzing state formation in 
Western Europe because, here, nation building generally occurred after the formation of strong 
states (Tilly 1975b, pp. 70-1, 80).4 This approach ‘freezes’ the nation with the view of better 
understanding the state and its evolution. Nevertheless, when state formation proceeds over 
largely heterogeneous populations as in the case of former colonial possessions, nation building 
becomes a significant part of state making. Therefore, analyzing processes of state formation 
that proceed over largely heterogeneous populations benefit from taking into consideration 
both aspects of state building and nation building. 
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Given that Western states acquired relative homogeneity in early stages of their state formation, 
which in turn facilitated drawing of boundaries and governance of populations, it is to be 
expected that nationalism—as an ideology that advocates congruence between state boundaries 
and ethnic identity of the people who live within them (Gellner 1983, p. 1)—did not play a 
crucial role in Western states formation processes. Indeed, it is from the French Revolution 
onwards that national or ethnic identity became important bases of mass mobilization. It 
follows, therefore, that nationalism (as a modern ideology) appeared only in the late stages of 
West European state formation, by which time Western states had already acquired a strong 
level of stateness. This is not the case with state formation in the rest of the world. The latter 
processes of state formation—particularly in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—coincide 
with the consolidation, utilization, and manipulation of nationalist ideology.5 
 
There is a general consensus that the idea of the nation is Western in origin.6 This is also an 
idea that enabled anti-colonial movements to challenge their subservience to Western world 
views and obtain independence in the form of new nation states, although no clear break with 
the former imperial powers ensued. Indeed, just like the colonizers needed to create a class of 
locals capable of taking on colonizers’ opinions and intellect—described as ‘mimic men’—so 
were colonizers intent to make sure that they hand over power to those who could safeguard 
imperial interests in the postcolonial era.7 In interrogating state building in the decolonized era, 
postcolonial theorists have been keen to emphasize that the West and the non-West have been 
‘constituted in the course of multifarious (unequal, hierarchical and usually coercive) 
exchanges, such that neither was left untouched’ (Seth 2013, p. 20).  
 
As postcolonial states emerged, they emulated—mimicked—the Western state model in a 
setting that was not entirely conducive to the new enterprise due to lack of Western liberal 
tradition and unformed national identities. Indeed, whilst the myth of the nation functioned as 
a useful resource of unity in opposing colonialism, the production of a unified national 
community has proved to be a daunting task. Most of the once-colonized nations have been 
plagued with problems emanating from fractured national identities, thus far failing to develop 
a national identity that reflects their cultural diversity (Kumaraswamy 2006, pp. 63-4). As 
Sankaran Krishna (2013, p. 124) observes, the postcolonial nation is cleft due to vast disparities 
both of culture and wealth. ‘The postcolonial nation is a serrated—not smooth—space, led and 
represented by middle classes but not inclusive of vast numbers of society…’—ethnic, 
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religious, linguistic minorities, and also women. Whilst the image of the sovereign (Western) 
state is (broadly) maintained, postcolonial states do not function in accordance with the ideal-
type polity found in the West (De Guevara 2012, pp. 4, 7). Postcolonial states’ institutions 
combine colonial, local, and international elements and function non-uniformly according to 
international (systemic) and local logics. Hence, postcolonial nation states are agonistic spaces 
characterized by hybridity, unfinished projects, and persistent contestations and opposition. 
 
Stateness, Nationhood, and Mimicry 
The preceding section has indicated that although the genealogy of state building can be traced 
in processes of state formation in Western Europe, contemporary processes of state building 
are not carbon copies of those in the West. Indeed, most states outside the western sphere 
experience limitations of their statehood—evidenced in not so high levels of stateness, or state 
capacity—and also ongoing challenges of split national identities. In the context of 
contemporary praxis of state building, an increasing critique—particularly with regard to cases 
that are internationally-led—suggests that nation building is being undermined due to 
international actors’ excessive focusing on institution building and ‘favouring (of) technically 
skilled practices’ (Lemay-Hébert et al 2014, p. 5) rather than working on societal cohesion. 
Such neglect of national cohesion appears to take place even as ‘nation building’ is frequently 
used to refer to ‘state building’, especially in the American scholarship, reflecting U.S. 
‘national experience and history, in which cultural and historical identity was heavily shaped 
by political institutions’ (Fukuyama 2004, p. 99; Von Hippel 2000; Chesterman 2004; Boot 
2017; Crowley 2017). 
 
In definitional terms, as mentioned in the preceding section, state building and nation building 
can be separated. The former refers to actions undertaken by inter/national actors to establish, 
reform, or strengthen state institutions and their connections with society; whereas the latter 
implies actions undertaken (primarily) by national actors, to forge a sense of common national 
identity by (a) overcoming ethnic differences; (b) countering competing sources of identity and 
loyalty; and (c) mobilizing the population behind the state building project (Call 2008, p. 5). 
Both state and nation building are conscious undertakings that depend on political action.  
 
However, few and far between have been scholarly interrogations of the impact of institutional 
building on nation building—including the mediating role of nationalism. In particular, the 
question of nationalism appears in the existing literature unfrequently, and mostly indirectly, 
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as part of the acknowledgement that state building is not simply about top-down construction 
or strengthening of state institutions but also about local influences and responses (refer for 
instance to Goetze and Guzinam 2008; and de Guevara 2008). A rare scholar to consider the 
role of nationalism on state building, Stephen J. Del Rosso (2013, p. 65) found that this role 
goes largely unnoticed due to nationalism’s ‘ability to “hide in plain sight”—as reflected in its 
relatively rare invocation in contemporary scholarly analyses on state building and even more 
infrequently citing in policy pronouncements and debates’.8   
 
The empirical record of contemporary state building, nevertheless, shows that institutional 
(re)construction has impacted on cohesion of nations and consequently on nation building. 
Functioning institutions can facilitate national cohesion and strengthen stateness in the 
process.9 Conversely, malfunctioning state institutions can impede nation building. Not 
infrequently, conception of institutions—and their working—have been underpinned by an 
ethnic framing of identity (Richmond 2014b; Hehir 2007). In Iraq, for example, the heavy 
population of state institutions with Shiites following de-Baathification, and subsequent under-
representation of the Sunnis, has marginalized and alienated the latter inducing resentment and 
resistance with dire consequences for the cohesion of the Iraqi society and stability of the state 
(refer to Herring and Rangwala 2005; Dodge 2006).  
 
Bosnia presents the most conspicuous example of institutions—mandated on the grounds of 
EU values and ‘European identity’—directly involved in a simulation of Bosnian identity. It 
may not be an overstatement to suggest that exaggerated forms of simulation have been central 
to EU activity in Bosnia (Chandler 2014, p. 122). A glance at the Bosnian flag—designed in 
the image (same colours) of the EU flag, with the white stars on a yellow and blue 
background—may give the impression that  Bosnia is more EU-orientated than are member 
states themselves. This despite serious ethnic frictions between Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs 
which inhibit societal cohesion, and with the country having virtually no prospects of joining 
the EU in the foreseeable future (Mulaj 2017). Here we have an example of the emulation of 
the dominant actors’ image despite the discrepancy with the reality of the subordinate. 
 
Power relations between dominant and subordinate actors in the contemporary state building 
projects exhibit interesting modes of emulations, and sometimes frictions in the form of 
contestations and even subversions. Mimicry is a useful concept for depicting these relations 
and their ensuing effects. Applied first to characterize power relations between colonizers and 
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colonized, mimicry refers to an elusive survival strategy for the colonized (Bhabha 1994, pp. 
85-6). By allowing the colonized to try on ‘the colonizer’s reflected image in the body of the 
“native”’ mimicry ‘subverts the hegemonic convention that the colonizer is always separate 
from and superior to the colonized’ (Ling 2004, p. 116).10  
 
Mimicry menaced colonizers by disclosing the ambivalence of the colonial discourse. 
Similarly, the dual articulation of mimicry in the context of international-led state building—
(1) as a strategy of reform (or rebuilding) in the image of the Western state model, and (2) as a 
sign of difference (incomplete, partial, hybrid replication of the real (Western model))—can 
undermine dominant authority and sow the seeds of disobedience, on the side of local 
(subordinate) parties. The dual articulation of mimicry enables the latter to shape agendas of 
dominant actors and reclaim (certain) terms of politics—revealing the mutual dependency of 
these two parties. Indeed, frames of governance and / or values introduced by international 
actors can generate contentious interpretations, challenges, discontent, and even resistance by 
local parties. Responses shaped by nationalist elites’ encounters with external actors and their 
sponsored institutions have come to condition relations of power, legitimacy, and expression 
of national identity.  
 
For instance, in Kosovo, despite ‘substantive mimicry’11—i.e., deep engagement of local, 
governing parties with practices of Western state building—competition between the two sides, 
at times, became inevitable. The prolonged mandate of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) elicited competing national and international agendas that turned the state building 
project into ‘a race for power’ consequently detracting from its legitimacy (Richmond 2005, 
chapter 5). UNMIK’s reluctance to facilitate the resolution of the status issue generated 
resistance from Kosovo’s Albanian population, who came to view UNMIK as an obstacle to 
achieving their national self-determination (Mulaj 2011). Ultimately, violent riots in March 
2004 put Kosovo’s independence on a faster track (declared in 2008). In this case reaction to 
institutional practices of state building mandated by the UN inadvertently enhanced expression 
of the national identity of the majority group. Similar dynamics may be materializing with 
regard to the national identity of the Iraqi Kurds (refer to Owtram 2017). 
 
In other words, the dominant and the subordinate parties in the context of international-led state 
building are bound up together in multiple and integral ways. Not only emulation allows the 
subordinate to try on its body the reflected image of the dominant, but resistance of the former 
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can alter agendas of the latter and shape outcomes. The local and the international inhibit 
interrelated spaces that foster mutually constitutive identities. The recognition of the mutually 
constitutive character of identity, in turn, requires an understanding of statebuilding as a multi-
layered process that is grounded on multiple locations of politics. 
 
Whereas politics of state building resides both in international and national locations, the task 
of bringing the imagined community into being ought to belong—primarily—to national 
actors. Their international counterparts are not really suitable to take the lead with this task. As 
David Lake has argued, state builders have limited mandates, limited powers, and crucially 
limited time (Lake 2016, p. 5). If international actors involved in state building become 
predominantly entangled with the construction of (others’) national identity they stand to be 
criticized for being out of touch with local traditions or outright delegitimizing nation building. 
For these reasons it is right that international state builders do not expand directly to nation 
building. The ability of foreign powers to build nations is limited, although external impact and 
/ or influence may be ever present.12 National actors preoccupy themselves with questions of 
national identity—sometimes in response to international actors’ involvement in national 
institutions and sometimes in order to legitimize local policies and agendas. National identity 
building activities are best assigned as a domain—mainly—of national actors.  
 
Conclusion 
State building has become central to the Western security strategy to address instability 
emanating from weak and failed states both at the international and national levels. The 
aspiration of security and peace remains the bedrock of state building processes—both 
international-led and home grown. The predominant part of the existing literature deals with 
challenges of institution building in fragile, post-conflict states; challenges of obtaining a 
modicum of legitimacy; and, overall, quality of emerging peace. What is missing in the existing 
literature is (1) a focused analysis of the genealogy of the contemporary state building and (2) 
a systematic consideration of the correlation between state building (as institution building) 
and nation building (as national identity building) and the international state builders’ positions 
to these. This contribution has aimed to fill this gap. 
 
The analysis has suggested that the genealogy of state building can be traced in processes of 
state formation in Western Europe. Sociological work has shown that as the European model 
of state expanded, the world has moved gradually towards stateness, in that, the processes of 
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state making have centered on ‘consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of 
governments from other organizations, acquisition of autonomy (and mutual recognition 
thereof)…, centralization and coordination’ (Tilly 1975b, p. 70). However, whereas nearly all 
West European governments have acquired a relatively high level of stateness, many states 
outside the Occident experience limitations of their statehood—evidenced in inadequate levels 
of stateness, or state capacity, and challenges of divergent national identities. Moreover, 
whereas nationalism emerged only during the final stages of the formation of West European 
polities, state formation outside the West has utilized (and manipulated) nationalist ideology 
throughout state formation processes. That nationalism’s role on state building continues apace 
in the contemporary context is a testimony of the fact that stateness and nationhood are 
mutually related.13 
 
The expansion of the European template has ensured a move from a relatively ‘internal’ to a 
strongly ‘external’ state formation process—a trend that has continued and accelerated through 
to the current era. In particular, international-led state building reflects an intensification of the 
external state formation process as a strategic response to wicked problems, wicked problems 
for both international and local stakeholders, emanating from inadequate governance—a 
persistent source of conflict, crime, and global instability. That outcomes have not entirely 
matched expectations may not be so surprising given the complex nature of fragile states, and 
disputed provision of public goods—including institutions—that state building seeks to offer 
(refer to Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 155).  
 
The contemporary policy and praxis of state building in postconflict setting has a clear 
institution building component and a prominent external / international aspect. Less emphasis 
is being placed on nation building even if the terms ‘state building’ and ‘nation building’ are 
used interchangeably by some authors (see, for instance, Fukuyama 2005; Paris and Sisk 2009). 
One challenging aspect of state building pertains to the expectation that state building should 
go hand-in-hand with nation building. For state building is a complex enterprise, not just a 
matter of getting the institutions ‘right’, but a process of social transformation that, to be 
successful, ought to minimize the internal cleavages conducive to state failure (Lake 2016, p. 
4). I share the view that state building is a process of social / national transformation that is 
bound to suffer inhibitions when detached from the needs and expectations of the local 
population/s. Linking state and society is central to state building. Even if this linkage in the 
contemporary international-led state building is imperfect, there is an observable correlation 
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between (re)construction of state institutions and nation building, with functioning institutions 
facilitating national coherence and strengthening stateness in the process. Conversely, 
malfunctioning state institutions can be an impediment to nation building. 
 
This contribution has suggested that power relations between dominant / international and 
subordinate / local actors can be depicted in terms of a dual articulation of mimicry, which have 
enabled local parties to reclaim the discourse of national identity but deliver (at best, only) 
hybrid forms of statehood. At the same time, an equal representation of the (imagined) nation 
has been elusive; with nation continuing to inhibit an agonistic space characterized by 
heterogeneity and difference. However, the main responsibility for the construction of 
nationhood, or national identity, should rest with the national parties. When international actors 
have engaged directly with aspects of national identity—such as in Bosnia—those endeavours 
have tended to result on simulations detached from what (all) local people (wish to) ascribe to 
themselves. 
 
As reasoned above, national identity is constituted via multiple exchanges with the other both 
outside and within the political community. Yet, the task of bringing the imagined community 
of the nation into being ought to belong—primarily—to national actors. If international parties 
involved in state building become directly entangled with the construction of (others’) national 
identity they stand to be criticized for being out of touch with local traditions or outright 
delegitimizing nation building. For this reason, it is right that international-led state building 
does not expand directly to nation building but focuses mainly on state institutions and 
economic and security provisions. National actors, instead, preoccupy themselves (not 
exclusively) with questions of national identity. Stateness is intrinsically connected to 
nationhood in every state building setting, due to national actors’ utilization of nationalism for 
their political ends, and the need to rely on national identity to legitimize their positions. Yet, 
whilst stateness and nationhood are intrinsically connected, it is necessary to recognize that the 
realization of the latter ought not to be a primary domain of the international community and 
actors operating on its behalf. National identity building activities are best left to local parties. 
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Notes  
  
1 Horst Rittel developed the idea of ‘wicked problems’ in the context of planning problems (see 
Rittel and Webber 1973, pp. 155-169). 
 
2 In the context of this contribution, ‘state building’ and ‘state making’ are used interchangeably 
to indicate that both short- and long-term processes of bringing about states are conscious and 
interrelated undertakings that depend on political action, even if some unintended results may 
ensue. 
 
3 It bears emphasizing that what is stressed here is relative homogeneity rather than full 
homogeneity. 
 
4 In fact, Tilly acknowledges that the papers presented in his edited volume neglect the 
treatment of nation building in comparison with state building (Tilly 1975b, p. 80). 
 
5 Nationalism is considered here to be a modern phenomenon that seeks congruence between 
state boundaries and cultural identity of the people who live within them (as defined by Gellner 
1983, p. 1), rather than a primordial phenomenon. 
 
6 It rose with the growth of Western capitalism and industrialization, and was a key feature of 
imperialist expansion (McLeod 2000, p. 68).  
 
7 Homi Bhabha has written of colonial mimicry as ‘the desire for a reformed, recognizable 
Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite’ (Bhabha 1994, p. 86). 
Hence the ambivalence of mimicry. Importantly, mimicry is at once a resemblance and menace; 
it is the sign of a double articulation: ‘a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, 
which “appropriates” the Other as it visualizes power’, but also ‘the sign of the inappropriate 
… a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial 
power … and poses an immanent threat to both “normalized” knowledges and disciplinary 
power’(ibid).  
 
8 For Del Rosso, the most valuable role that nationalism can play in state building relates to the 
question of legitimacy: the ‘greater the extent to which “the people” share or accede to the 
nationalist project of the state, the more likely it is that [the state] legitimacy will be established’ 
(Del Rosso 2013, p. 75).  
 
9 The record of contemporary international-led state building offers more cases of failure rather 
than success (Lake 2016, p. 3; Richmond 2014c, p. 70). Nonetheless cases of qualified success 
exist such as Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Somaliland. For the latter two refer to Lake (2016, 
chapters 4 and 5).  
 
10 For an application of mimicry in the context of Russia’s power projection in Central Asia 
refer to Owen, Heathershaw, and Savin 2017. 
 
11 L.H.M. Ling (2004, pp. 116-7) differentiates between formal and substantive mimicry. The 
former replicates an affect of the self by the other (surface copying). The latter refers to 
situations where formal mimicry deepens into a cumulative strategy that fosters learning and 
produces a hybrid sense of self and other. 
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12 As noted above, the external impact and / or influence can be manifested in forms of informal 
or substantive mimicry. International actors can advance nation building also by facilitating 
domestic compromises and creating incentives for domestic groups in fragile states to settle 
their differences peacefully and consolidate institutions conducive to good governance and 
national inclusion (Lake 2016, especially pp. 205, 208). 
 
13 The mutual impact of nationhood—and nationalism—on stateness can be observed also in 
some present state contestations in the West, as for instance, the Basques/Catalonia secession 
movements in Spain. Such impact shows that state and nation building are ongoing, never-
ending processes even in well-established polities. Because the main preoccupation of this 
paper has been contemporary cases of international-led state building in postconflict setting 
and their historical context, space has been limited to consider here cases of home grown nation 
/ state building either in the West or elsewhere. 
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